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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) provide an ex-
tensible and effective means to monitor large and geographically
diverse areas. Nodes in a WSN are characterized by very
strict constraints in terms of computing power and energy
consumption, as a result of which efficient and secure data-
aggregation techniques are being proposed as enabling technol-
ogy for reducing network load, while at the same time providing
high sensing accuracy and data integrity. In this paper, we
present an hybrid mesh/sensor network architecture based on
a sharing of tasks between mesh routers and sensor nodes.
Our architecture is particularly suitable to realize an application
agnostic mesh backhaul, able to concurrently support multiple
WSNs while ensuring both end–to–end encryption and hop–by–
hop authentication. Simulation analyses have shown that the
proposed scheme can significantly reduce the network load while
preserving data confidentiality and integrity. Finally, a real-world
prototype has been implemented and tested over a small scale
testbed confirming the simulation results.
Index Terms—wireless networks, IEEE 802.11, sensors net-
works, mesh architecture, secure aggregation, simulations
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Network technologies support data collec-
tion and distributed data processing by means of very small
sensing devices [1] characterized by limited computation and
energy capabilities. WSNs are used in many contexts, such
as telemedicine, surveillance systems, assistance to disabled
and elderly people, environmental monitoring, localization of
services and users, industrial process control, and systems
supporting traffic monitoring/control in urban/suburban areas,
military and/or anti-terrorism operations.
An important goal when designing WSNs is minimizing
the number of transmissions and the length of each commu-
nication, thus reducing the overall power consumption of the
network. Using data aggregation algorithms (e.g., see [2], [3],
[4]) can significantly reduce the number of bytes exchanged
across the network. However, such solutions raise several
privacy and security challenges in that, data aggregation is
potentially vulnerable to attackers who may inject bogus
information without being detected. Moreover, typical security
and privacy solutions, used in wireless networks, are not
applicable to WSNs due to their relatively high requirements
in terms of computing power. As a result, secure and energy
efficient WSNs are receiving considerable attention from the
research community [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].
In this paper, we propose an hybrid architecture combining
WSNs with wireless mesh networking (WMN)1. More specif-
ically, sensor nodes use their resources (i.e. power) only to
implement sensing functionalities, while mesh routers perform
the secure aggregation of the incoming data, and then relay the
aggregated messages to the Sink reducing the amount of traffic
exchanged over the network and thus the overall power con-
sumption. As a result, our architecture is a perfect candidate to
implement the networking backend for an application agnostic
middleware, able to support multiple sensing applications
while ensuring both end–to–end encryption and hop–by–hop
authentication. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are
no other works that exploit an hybrid WSN/WMN architecture
to jointly address security and power consumption issues.
The paper is organized as follow. Section II summarizes
the security model employed by this work. In Section III
we introduce the proposed network architecture. Section IV
discusses the design choices we made while designing our
prototype. Section V presents the results of our simulation
campaign, while the results from our prototype–based evalua-
tion are reported in Section VI. A brief overview of the state
of the art is presented in Section VII. Finally, Sec. VIII draws
some conclusions and provides hints for future works.
II. SECURITY MODEL
Secure data aggregation becomes especially challenging if
end-to-end privacy between sensors and the Sink is required. In
literature, there are several works defined in order to guarantee
security of the aggregated data. The main contributions can be
grouped into hop-by-hop [3], [12], [13] and end-to-end [2],
[14] secure aggregation. The solution presented in this work
belongs to the latter category and builds on top of the addi-
tively homomorphic stream cipher proposed by Castelluccia
et al. in [2]. Such a cipher uses modular additions and is
thus very well suited for resources–constrained devices. Data
aggregated using this cipher can be used to efficiently compute
statistical values such as mean, variance and standard deviation
enabling significant bandwidth gain.
1This extends our previous work on secure aggregation in hybrid wireless
sensors and mesh networks [11] by simplifying the communication protocol
and by validating the proposed architecture using both simulations and a real–
world prototype.
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For readers’ convenience, the homomorphic encryption
scheme proposed in [2] is briefly sketched here. Each sensor
represents its message  as an integer  ∈ [0; − 1],
where  is a large integer. Let  be a randomly generated
keystream, where  ∈ [0; − 1], the encrypted ciphertext 
is given by:
 = (; ;) = + () (1)
The sensor then forwards the ciphertext  to its parent,
which aggregates all the  received from its children:
 =
X
=1
() (2)
The cleartext message can then be obtained by:
 = ( ) = − ();  =
X
=1
 (3)
Where Enc() and Dec() respectively denote the encryption
and decryption scheme;  is the message space and  the
ciphertext space such that  is a group under operation ⊕
and  is a group under operation ⊗. In other words, the
result of the application of function ⊕ on plaintext values
may be obtained by decrypting the result of ⊗ applied to the
corresponding encrypted values. Besides,  assumes value in
the range 0 ≤  ≤  . Due to the commutative property
of addition, the above scheme is additively homomorphic. In
fact, if 1 = (1; 1;) and 2 = (2; 2;) then
1 + 2 = (1 +2; 1 + 2;).
Note that if  different ciphers  are added, then  must
be larger than
P, otherwise correctness is not provided. In
fact if
P is larger than , decryption will result in a value
0 that is smaller than  . In practice, if  = () then
 should be selected as ( = 2log(∗)). The keystream 
can be generated by using a streamcipher, such as RC4, keyed
with a node’s secret key and a unique message . Finally,
each sensor node shares a unique secret key with the Sink.
Such keys are derived from a master secret (known only to
the Sink) and distributed to the sensor nodes. However, the
key distribution protocol is outside the scope of this work.
III. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
The network architecture for secure aggregation proposed in
this work is sketched in Fig. 1. A multi-hop wireless backhaul
is exploited by clusters of sensors nodes in order to deliver
the sensed data to the Sink. Each cluster consists of a variable
number of sensors, one Sensor Head and one mesh router,
which acts as Cluster Head.
Albeit in the pictures they are shown as single entity,
Cluster Head and Sensor Head functionalities are conceptually
separated and as such can be implemented by different nodes,
one equipped with a WSN interface (e.g. IEEE802.15.4) and
the other equipped with a WMN interface (e.g. IEEE 802.11).
In such a case, the sensor node that is directly connected
Fig. 1: Reference network model for the hybrid mesh/sensor
secure aggregation scheme.
to the Cluster Head is termed Sensor Head. Sensor Heads
are in charge for gathering encrypted messages coming from
local sensor nodes, while Cluster Heads implement the secure
aggregation scheme by combining local messages with ag-
gregated messages coming from other Cluster Heads. Sensor
nodes within a cluster may as well exploit multi–hopping in
order to reach their Cluster Head.
The proposed aggregation scheme requires that all sensors
in a cluster send their data within the same sampling period.
Such a goal can be achieved either by having synchronized
sensor nodes, or by implementing a polling scheme at the
Cluster Head level. Our architecture implements the latter
solution. Sensor nodes, however, are not required to reply to all
requests. This design choice stems from the consideration that,
in a WSN, nodes can be unavailable for a number of reasons
ranging from a temporary lack of connectivity, a limited
battery, or simply hardware failures or a malicious removal.
Nevertheless, if the cleartext message is to be obtained from
the aggregated message, the network Sink must be able to
derive the list of the ids of the non-responding sensor nodes.
In order to address this issue we introduced a message, named
Aggregated Message (AMEX), generated by the Cluster heads
and containing a list of the non–responding nodes in a cluster.
Such a list can be easily computed by the Cluster head using
the message received from the sensor nodes and the list of
sensor nodes in its cluster (obtained using an initial raging
procedure). In–cluster aggregation is also supported, allowing
sensor nodes to both perform ciphertexts addition and message
forwarding. In this configuration, each sensor concatenates
the ids of the messages being relayed creating a new In-
Cluster Aggregated Message (IAMEX). It is worth noticing
that, if a locally generated sample is added to the aggregated
ciphertext then also the local sensor’s id shall be appended to
the IAMEX message. Please note that the evaluation of the
in–cluster aggregation is out of the scope of this work.
An high-level overview of the Cluster Head’s architecture
is sketched in Fig. 2. Continuous lines represent communi-
cation channels that use the IAMEX format, while dashed
lines represent communication channels that use the AMEX
format. It is worth stressing that, thanks to the homomorphic
additive encryption scheme, messages of the same type can
be aggregated in a end–to–end fashion by simply adding their
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Fig. 2: Architecture of the Cluster head.
ciphertexts and appending the nodes’ ids.
The entire procedure, exploited in order to securely convey
and aggregate the samples collected by the sensor nodes to the
network Sink, can be decomposed into the following steps:
1) Cluster Heads periodically poll all the sensors in their
cluster. Polling packets can be either flooded across the
entire cluster or, if broadcast is not supported, they can
be sent using unicast transmissions.
2) Upon polling, each sensor generates a packet containing
a single encrypted sample that is then forwarded to the
Sensor Head.
3) Sensor Heads receive the packets coming from sensor
nodes in their cluster and store them in a local queue. As
soon as  packets are received or when a timeout has
expired, each Sensor Head aggregates each encrypted
samples and generates a IAMEX packet that is then sent
to the Cluster Head.
4) Cluster Heads receive both the IAMEX packets coming
from its cluster and the AMEX packets coming from the
neighbouring cluster head, then aggregate them into a
new single AMEX packet which is sent to the Sink.
5) The Sink receives all the AMEX packets, deciphers the
ciphertext and computes the relevant statistical informa-
tion (e.g. average and/or variance).
IV. DESIGN CHOICES
In order to prove its viability in a realistic scenario, we
implemented a specific use case on top of our hybrid archi-
tecture. The ensuing application computes the average and the
variance of the physical phenomena monitored by the WSN
(e.g. the temperature). In this section, we will describe the
design choices we made while designing the application, while
in Sec. V and in Sec. VI, we will report on its evaluation using
respectively simulations and a prototypical implementation.
In the application scenario envisioned in this work, each
sensor node periodically samples the environmental temper-
ature. The collected data is then forwarded to the Cluster
Head through the sensor cluster, where the secure aggrega-
tion scheme is implemented. In order to obtain average and
variance, sensor nodes are required to compute:
 =
X
=1
  =
X
=1
2 (4)
where  is the individual value measured by a sensor node
and  is the total number of answering sensors. The sink will
Fig. 3: Message format used in our secure aggregation scheme.
then receive two distinct values, which can be used to compute
both the average () and the variance  ():
() =
P
=1
 (
2) =
P
=12
 (5)
 () = (2)−()2 (6)
It is worth noting that, in computing the average, the
modulus  must be large enough to prevent any overflow.
The modulus is thus chosen as follows:  =  ∗ , where
 = () is the maximum value that can be assumed
by the message, and  is the total number of sensor nodes
in the network. Therefore each ciphertexts will be () =
()+() bits long. Moreover, if also the variance of the
measured data has to be derived an additional modulus  0 is
necessary for the sum of the squares. As for the average, also
 0 must be large enough to prevent overflow and it is then
chosen as follows:  0 =  ∗ 2. The size of the ciphertext is
therefore ( 0) = 2 ∗ () + () bits.
Two strings, each of them 32 bits long, have been used to
encode, respectively, the sum of the values reported by each
sensor node (
P
=1) and sum of their squares (
P
=12 ).
Setting the maximum number of sensor nodes allowed in the
WSNs to  = 28 = 256, leaves us with 24 bits to represent
2. As a result, we have the following constraint on the range
temperatures that can be represented:  ∈ [0 212]. In fact,
in order to represent the square of the maximum value that
can be assumed by  (212 = 4096) without incurring in any
overflow, 24 bits are necessary.
The message format, devised in order to implement the
secure aggregation scheme, introduces 4 different headers and
consists of 6 fields, plus an optional list of sensor nodes ids
appended at the end of the message and used only in the
AMEX and the IAMEX message types. The fields in the
header are packed with the most significant byte first (big
endian). The most significant bit is numbered 0, so the Version
field is actually found at the fourth most significant bits of the
first byte. The message format is illustrated in Fig. 3. Here,
follows a detailed description of the various fields:
• Version (4–bits). The protocol version (set to 0).
• Type (4–bits). The message type:
– IAMEX. Aggregated message emitted by a Sensor
Head. The Sensor/s field contains the number of
sensors that contributed to this value. The header is
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followed by the ids of the nodes whose samples have
been summed to produce the aggregated value.
– AMEX. Aggregated message emitted by a Cluster
head. The Sensor/s field contains the number of
sensors that failed to produce a sample. The header
is followed by the ids of the non–responding nodes.
– Sink. Sink message emitted by a Sink. This mes-
sage contains the aggregated value in cleartext. The
Sensor/s field contains the number of sensors that
contributed to this value.
• Application (8–bits). Used to distinguish among different
set of monitored information (e.g. humidity, pressure,
etc.). It can be used to map up to 256 different WSN
applications over the same mesh–backhaul.
• Sensor/s (16–bits). Different meanings according to the
particular message type, as you read above.
• Average (32–bits). Sum of the readings produced by the
sensor node/s.
• Variance (32–bits). Sum of the squares of the readings
produced by the sensor node/s.
• ID(i). List of sensor nodes’ ids (16–bit each). Their
meaning depends on the particular message type.
Please note that padding is used in order to ensure that the
whole message contains an integral number of 32-bit words.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we aim at evaluating the bandwidth effi-
ciency of our secure aggregation architecture (Agg) in com-
parison with a baseline scenario where no aggregation is
used (No–Agg). The hop–by–hop (HBH) aggregation scheme
discussed in [2] is not considered in that, albeit characterized
by a slightly higher bandwidth transmission gain, it does not
address the end–to–end security concerns. The experimental
data on which this work is based together with all the scripts
used during the post–processing phase are made available to
the research community2. Notice that, the evaluation of the
data confidentiality and integrity features supported by our
hybrid architecture has already been provided by Castelluccia
et al. in [2] and is thus out of scope for this work.
A. Simulation Environment
The evaluations were carried out using the OMNET++
simulator (version 4.1). The INETMANET and the MiXiM
models have been used in order to simulate respectively the
IEEE802.11–based mesh backhaul and the IEEE802.15.4–
based sensor clusters. Each cluster is composed of one mesh
router (See Fig. 4a) equipped with two radio interfaces and
one or more wireless sensor/s (See Fig. 4b) each of them
equipped with a single radio interface. The primary mesh
router interface, derived from the INETMANET framework,
is an IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) interface operating in the ISM
2.4 GHz frequency band while the secondary, derived from
MiXiM framework, is an IEEE 802.15.4 interface operating
in ISM 868 MHz frequency band. It is worth stressing that,
2Online resources at http://www.wing-project.org/.
(a) Mesh router equipped with
two interfaces.
(b) Sensor node equipped
with a single interface.
Fig. 4: Simulation environment’s setup.
the mesh router is equipped with two different interfaces in
that it is implementing both Sensor Head and CLuster Head
functionalities. Mesh connectivity is implemented by means
of the AODV mesh routing protocol. The sensor nodes are
arranged in a star topology around the mesh router. One mesh
router acts as a gateway implementing Sink functionalities.
B. Simulation Scenarios
The following scenarios have been considered:
• No–Agg. In this scenario, when a Cluster Head receives
an encrypted packet from either its sensors cluster or
neighbouring cluster head, it immediately forwards it to
the Sink. No aggregation is performed in this scenario
which serves as baseline for the rest of the evaluation.
• Aggregation N. Every packet received by the Cluster
Head is stored into a FIFO queue. After the   arrivals
the queue is emptied and an AMEX packet is generated
and forwarded to the Sink. The values of  considered
for this study have been 4 8 12.
The duration of each simulation has been set to 240 seconds.
The results reported in this work are the average of 10 runs
executed with different seed values for the random number
generator. This section reports the results obtained with 3
sensor clusters each of them containing one mesh router and 7
sensors distributed over a 500x500 meters square field where
mesh routers and sensors nodes are randomly distributed at
initialization time. Both mesh and sensor node are not mobile.
C. Results
Figure 5a reports the number of packets delivered to the
Sink over the WiFi interface during the entire simulation time
for increasing values of the aggregation threshold  . As
expected, increasing the value of  results in a significant
reduction in the number of packets delivered to the Sink, and
thus forwarded across the network which in time results in a
lower channel utilization and energy consumption. The initial
transition time, which can be noticed in Fig. 5b, is strictly
related with the Cluster Head’s polling period, which for this
simulations was set to 2 seconds.
Finally, Fig. 6 reports the histogram of the AMEX mes-
sages’ inter-arrival times for different values of the aggregation
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Fig. 5: Outcomes of the simulations campaign.
Sink
Fig. 7: The linear network topology exploited during our study.
threshold. As expected it can be noticed, the inter-arrival time
increases with the value of  , in particular for  = 12,
intervals as long as 10 seconds can be observed.
VI. PROTOTYPE
A prototype has also been implemented and tested in order
to demonstrate the practical viability of our approach in
realistic settings. This study has been conducted exploiting
4 mesh routers organized in a linear topology (see Fig. 7) and
implementing both Cluster Head and Sensor Head function-
alities. A Dell D630 laptop, connected through an Ethernet
cable to the fourth Cluster Head, has been exploited as
network Sink. Sensor nodes have been emulated by means
of a software process running within each mesh router. This
process emulates a flat WSN computing both the average and
the variance of the physical phenomena monitored by the
WSN (e.g. the temperature). Each sensors cluster is composed
by 60 nodes. The mesh backhaul has been implemented using
the WING toolkit, an experimental IEEE 802.11 wireless mesh
network [15], [16].
In the envisioned application, the WSN is required to
monitor the temperature of a certain area, and as a result, each
sensor periodically generates a random temperature sample
uniformly distributed in [28 32]. Period is set to 5 seconds.
Table I and II respectively report the number of packets and
bytes sent at each hop of the network. As in [2], we consider
three scenarios: (i) all sensor nodes reply; (ii) 90% of the
nodes replies; and (iii) only 70% of the sensor nodes replies.
Cluster heads (i.e. mesh routers) do not generates any sample,
moreover, we assume that the distribution of non–responding
nodes is uniform across all the clusters.
As it can be seen, in the No-Agg scenario, nodes that
are closer to the Sink transmit an amount of data that is
significantly higher (see Hop 4 in the tables) than the data
TABLE I: Number of packets relayed at each hop.
Hops No–Agg Agg Agg (90%) Agg (70%)
1 10860 180 180 180
2 21660 180 187 193
3 32520 180 188 193
4 43380 181 188 193
TABLE II: Number of bytes relayed at each hop.
Hops No–Agg Agg Agg (90%) Agg (70%)
1 434400 7200 8552 10628
2 866400 7200 10784 16036
3 1300800 7200 12532 20096
4 1735200 7240 14086 24084
transmitted by the previous Cluster Heads. On the other hand,
in the Agg scheme, the number of transmissions is constant
while the amount of bytes exchanged at each hops increases.
Such a behavior is due to the ids of the non–responding nodes
that need to be appended to the aggregated samples being
transmitted. Such a list becomes larger and larger as the sample
get closer to the Sink.
VII. RELATED WORK
State-of-the-art solutions for secure data aggregation can
be classified as hop–by–hop data aggregation and end–to–end
data aggregation. In the former approach, data is encrypted
by the sensing nodes and decrypted at each hop before being
delivered to the Sink. In the latter approach, data is decrypted
only by the Sink.
Different hop–by–hop solutions [3], [12], [13] assumes that
data security is guaranteed by means of some key distribution
schemes; for example SEDAN [4] proposes a secure hop–
by–hop data aggregation protocol, in which each node can
verify the integrity of its two hops neighbors’ data. SEDAN [4]
provides a totally distributed scheme to guarantee data in-
tegrity. The SEDAN performance, evaluated by means of ad-
hoc simulation, shows a better behavior than other solutions,
i.e., SAWAN [3], in terms of overhead and mean time to de-
tection. Nevertheless, all hop–by–hop secure data aggregation
solutions are vulnerable to attacks at the intermediate nodes,
that can be tampered, leaving the attackers with complete
access to the sensor readings.
End-to-end techniques, such as [2], [14], [10], overcome this
limitation by requiring all the nodes to share an encryption
key only with the Sink possibly using novel distribution
schemes [17], [18], [19]. Particularly, SeDap [10] addresses
the privacy as well as security aggregation issues adopting an
end-to-end additively homomorphic encryption. An alternative
approach is represented by the use of public–key encryption
scheme, such as the one presented in [20]. The drawback
of this solution is represented by the high computational
requirements imposed by public–key schemes.
As opposed to the aforementioned solutions, our work
exploits an hybrid sensor/mesh network architecture where an
homomorphic encryption scheme is implemented by the sensor
nodes, while data aggregation operations are performed by
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Fig. 6: Histogram of the AMEX messages’ inter-arrival times for different values of the aggregation threshold  .
mesh routers that are not required to know the actual content
of the message being processed. Our architecture is capable
of providing data confidentiality and integrity while, at the
same time, reducing the amount of traffic exchanged over the
network and thus the overall power consumption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In order to make WSNs a viable choice for distributed data
collection and processing, security and privacy issues and en-
ergy efficiency shall be addressed as a single challenge rather
than two incompatible requirements. The hybrid mesh/sensor
architecture proposed in this paper is a first step toward such
an ambitious goal. The sharing of task that characterize our
solution is particularly suitable for designing and implement-
ing an application agnostic mesh backhaul capable of sup-
porting multiple WSN applications while ensuring both end-
to-end secure data aggregation. The proposed solution is also
independent from the types of data that are sensed and handled
by the nodes; hence it can be applied to simple applications
measuring average temperature of the environment, as well as
to multimedia sensor networks whose nodes may exchange
audio and video signals.
In order to prove the viability of our architecture in a
realistic scenario, we exploited it to implement a specific
use case, namely collecting and processing the mean and the
average value of a physical phenomena measured by a WSN
(the temperature). The performance of our approach has been
deeply analyzed by means of a simulation campaign and a real
world prototype. The results showed the our hybrid approach
significantly outperform the currently available solutions. As
a future work, we plan to address both node location in-
formation’s privacy issues and run-time data trustworthiness.
Moreover, we will introduce other security mechanisms able
to reveal malicious behaviours. We also plan to exploit our
hybrid architecture as reference platform for the development
of innovative and really dynamic applications, such as the new
Internet of Things applications.
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